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MAKING WAR ON JUPITER PLUVIUS 
THE CULTURE AND SCIENCE OF RAINMAKING 
IN THE SOUTHERN GREAT PLAINS, 1870-1913 
MICHAEL R. WHITAKER 
For two weeks in August 1891, the grounds of 
the "C" Ranch in rural West Texas thundered 
with the sound of explosions, as a federal govern-
ment-sponsored expeditionary force hurled hun-
dreds of pounds of heavy ordnance against an 
invisible enemy. In command of this unusual op-
eration was "General" Robert Dyrenforth, who 
with $9,000 of congressional funding in pocket 
was doing his utmost to find out whether, as a bit 
of folk wisdom ran, the furious tumult and aerial 
concussions of battle could somehow cause rain. 
From tiny western hamlets to the metropolises of 
the East, Americans were fascinated by the sen-
sational experiments. In magazines, newspapers, 
and journals, some scoffed at what they saw as 
a fool's errand and an egregious waste of public 
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funds, while others were equally certain of the 
reality of the connection and regarded the poten-
tial windfall great enough to justifY any expense. 
Scientists in particular were almost unanimously 
doubtful (and occasionally hostile), and made 
their views clear in the scholarly organs of their 
profession. In the end, the experiments failed to 
prove a definitive connection; indeed, as many 
had predicted all along, sober assessments of the 
data yielded litrle to suggest any causal link be-
tween explosions and rainfall. Yet, curiously, this 
was by no means the end of the theory. Over the 
course of two decades, a colorful cast of charac-
ters, from an eccentric self-titled "general" to a 
millionaire cereal magnate-cum-social engineer, 
typified a stubborn core of devoted believers. 
Each attempted to prove (or make practical use 
of) the theory by discharging various weapons 
and explosives at the sky, hoping that raindrops 
would come down in exchange. 
How is it that in spite of the vehement opposi-
tion of scientific experts and the ambiguous re-
sults of field tests, the theory maintained such a 
durable and loyal following, and even won federal 
funding? This essay will attempt to demonstrate 
that the appeal and resiliency of the concussive 
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theory of "pluviculture" stems from the fact that 
its foundation was cultural-rooted in social-po-
litical attitudes about the environment and prog-
ress-as much or more than it was scientific. In 
other words, within the United States, the theory 
established a devoted following and was able to 
~thstand unanimous scientific critique and even 
practical failures because it originated in power-
ful and deeply held ideas in the American psyche 
of the Progressive era.! 
Foremost among these ideas was the notion of 
North America as a landscape that ought to be 
conquered and tamed by Americans as a kind of 
grand national endeavor-a sentiment neatly en-
capsulated and expressed by the phrase "manifest 
destiny." In terms of the environment, this played 
out in a large-scale pattern of clearing away the 
wilderness and putting plow to earth wherever 
settlers wished to grow crops, with little regard 
to the local climate and terrain.2 And where Na-
tive groups were seen as an obstacle to progress, 
colonists and soldiers often waged war against 
them. The concussion theory, then, offered the 
psychologically satisfying thought that the struggle 
to tame the environment and the struggle against 
the Native peoples were in fact one in the same, 
and accordingly might be "won" with literally the 
very same "weapons" and strategies-the detona-
tion of high explosives. For this reason, as we shall 
see, the language and aesthetics of militarism and 
conquest permeated the discourse and conduct of 
concussionist experiments. Furthermore, inflex-
ible determination was elevated as the attribute 
both necessary and sufficient for success. 
The lived experience of the Civil War was an-
other factor that contributed to the resiliency of 
the concussionist position. The Civil War was a 
conflict of unprecedented carnage and destruc-
tion, of countrymen taking up arms against one 
another and national unity shattered, and of 
profound moral questions over the institution 
of slavery and the status of African Americans 
in American society. Alongside these weighty is-
sues, however, veterans reflecting on their war 
experience also very often remembered the pre-
cipitation. A rifleman who fought at Antietam, 
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Shiloh, Chicka-
mauga, or Gettysburg, to name only a few cases, 
would have experienced a drenching rain at some 
point after the battle's conclusion. So strong was 
the apparent connection that it became a matter 
of general understanding that the concussion of 
battle would reliably bring precipitation.3 Hence, 
when Edward Powers published a chronicle of 
Civil War battles followed by rain in his 1871 War 
and the Weather, he was not advancing a novel 
theory but rather putting into print a conclusion 
that thousands of Union and Confederate sol-
diers from private to general had already formed 
in their own minds. In this way, the concussionist 
theory appealed to a shared experience lodged in 
the minds of an enormous cohort of former fight-
ing men.4 This strong reliance on experience also 
served to immunize the theory against criticisms 
based on theories of meteorology and physics. 
Even before independence, many Americans 
had regarded westward expansion as an expres-
sion of national progress and personal liberation, 
a sentiment that grew stronger with the advent 
of the industrial revolution and its concomitant 
urbanization in the early nineteenth century. 
The Great Plains had beckoned would-be settlers 
from the east to escape the ceaseless toil of the big 
city and come west to try their hand at agricul-
ture, filling their lungs with the refreshing air of 
the independent life and revitalizing the national 
spirit. But where railroads and land barons had 
promised endless tracts of fecund soil and effort-
less harvests, geography often failed to match ex-
pectations, and in few places was this truer than 
the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plains, a sprawling, 
bone-dry expanse of beige that could go months 
or even years at a time with little to no precipita-
tion. It was in this desperate situation that Ameri-
cans began dreaming up other ways to bring pre-
cious moisture to the land. Some posited that 
the farmer who took a leap of faith in cultivating 
marginal land would be rewarded with increased 
rainfall. As early as 1867, University of Pennsyl-
vania geologist Ferdinand Hayden was suggesting 
that the mere act of settlement was improving 
the climate of the West, a sentiment that C. D. 
Wilbur later summed up in the famous mantra 
"rain follows the plow."5 A similar idea, that the 
electrical current carried in railroad tracks or tele-
graph wires had increased precipitation in the 
West, was sufficiently believed that John Wesley 
Powell felt it necessary to include a disproof in 
his 1878 Report on the Lands of the Arid Region.6 In 
view of these facts, the concussion theory emerg-
es as a natural next step in a progression of ideas 
in which tokens of civilization and progress were 
imagined to have some power to affect the envi-
ronment. Concussionism, however, reduced the 
tokenism in favor of heavy firepower, preferring 
realist to symbolic thinking. 
SETTING THE STAGE 
The single most influential text in the story of the 
concussionism was Edward Powers's War and the 
Weather. The book compiled a list of hundreds of 
battles that had been followed by rain, and the 
aforementioned wetness of the Civil War pro-
vided plenty of grist for Powers's mill. War and 
the Weather first appeared in print in 1871, with a 
second edition appearing in 1890. In the interim 
between the publications, Powers and others of a 
similar mentality had persistently memorialized 
Congress, the army, the navy, and several other 
governmental offices to contribute funding and 
weaponry to test the idea, and scored a crucial 
convert in the person of Illinois senator Charles 
B. Farwell. Farwell made the cause a pet project, 
introducing several requests for funding in the 
Senate, and finally gained traction with his col-
leagues in 1890, the same year War and the Weath-
er reappeared for a new generation of readers. By 
that time, the rainy battles of the Civil War would 
not have been so fresh in the public memory as 
they had been in 1871, but another factor had by 
then emerged to renew the relevance and popu-
larity of the theory: accelerating settlement of the 
Great Plains coupled with severe and recurring 
droughts in the late 1880s. At Farwell's behest, 
Congress authorized $9,000 to be set aside for 
testing the strange hypothesis. As nothing of this 
sort had ever been attempted before, there was 
some uncertainty as to which branch of the gov-
ernment ought to handle it, but it was eventually 
decided that the most appropriate agency was the 
Division of Forestry, then within Jeremiah Rusk's 
Department of Agriculture. 7 This decision would 
put something of a wrinkle in the proceedings; 
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Bernhard Fernow, chief of the Forestry Division, 
was adamant that his division lacked the appara-
tus and authority to carry out such an undertak-
ing, and moreover, was embarrassed to be con-
nected to what he considered rank foolishness. In 
his annual report to Rusk, for example, Fernow 
declared that any experiments "would hardly fail 
to be barren of results."8 
Having made his objections clear, Fernow was 
relieved of his responsibilities, and the operation 
was redelegated to assistant secretary of agricul-
ture Edwin Willits. Though more sympathetic to 
the possibility of rainmaking by concussion, Wil-
lits was in agreement with Fernow that neither 
the Forestry Division nor its parent department 
were equipped to perform the experiments. For 
this reason, Willits in February 1891 appointed 
an ad hoc special agent in the person of "Gen-
eral" Robert G. Dyrenforth-a Washington, DC, 
patent lawyer with an amateur interest in me-
teorology and explosives, and not incidentally, a 
convinced concussionist-to execute the experi-
ments.9 Dyrenforth spent the next five months 
assembling a team of assistants, acquiring materi-
als, and selecting a test site, eventually accepting 
the offer of Chicago meat packer Nelson Morris, 
who promised to extend the party complimen-
tary room and board at his "c" Ranch outside 
Midland, Texas, while underwriting labor costs 
and other miscellaneous expenses. Local business 
concerns were similarly generous, donating gun-
powder, dynamos, chemicals, and other useful 
goods to the effort, while the Texas and Pacific 
Railroad extended further assistance in the form 
of free transportation of personnel and material 
to Midland.lO 
In August 1891, the arrangements now sorted 
out, Dyrenforth and his entourage made their 
way by rail to the test site. Dyrenforth had decid-
ed that oversize kites carrying "rackarock" charges 
and hydrogen-oxygen balloons would offer a su-
perior concussion and be easier to elevate to the 
desired altitude. Therefore he brought with him 
a balloonist and two chemists who would oversee 
the field production of the hydrogen and oxygen 
gas that would provide both the balloons' buoyant 
force and explosive matter. Also in the party were 
two guests of honor: ex-Confederate general Dan-
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FIo. 1. Dyrenforth and party at the "c" Ranch, Texas, 1891. Dyrenforth is fifth from the left (seated in chair, hands resting on 
thighs). 
iel Ruggles, who in 1880 had patented a method 
of artificial rainmaking involving balloons with 
attached dynamite charges, and Edward Powers, 
whose book had been so instrumental in trans-
forming a folk theory into an object of serious 
scientific inquiry. Rounding out the investigative 
team was George E. Curtis of the Smithsonian 
Institution, a meteorologist who, like division 
chief Fernow, was sharply skeptical of the prin-
ciple at the foundation of the endeavor.1I 
EXPERIMENTING BEGINS 
Beginning on August 9, Dyrenforth and his party 
began unleashing their fearsome barrages against 
the atmosphere (initially at the "C" Ranch and 
subsequently at El Paso and San Diego, Texas, at 
the invitation of local businesses and municipal 
leaders), inflating and exploding several dozen 
oxyhydrogen balloons and detonating thousands 
of pounds of explosives over the course of several 
weeks. Dyrenforth took pains to ensure that the 
desert trial simulated a battle in both appearance 
and spirit. In terms of arrangement, the "general" 
arranged three parallel two-mile-long firing lines in 
a formation that must have resembled a battery of 
artillery pieces. On the front line was a row of jury-
rigged mortars that were set up as to hurl dyna-
mite and rackarock charges skyward. Supporting 
the front line was a line of custom-built kites with 
dynamite charges attached, tethered to the earth 
by electrical cable that also served to transmit the 
detonation signal. Finally, in the rearguard of the 
battalion was the "main line" at which twelve-
foot balloons filled with oxygen and hydrogen gas 
would ascend hundreds of feet in the air to be 
exploded, like the kites, by electrical signals from 
the groundY But even in the superficial and the 
intangible details, Dyrenforth adopted a military 
model, sporting a pith helmet and cavalry boots 
throughout the investigation. The official party 
portrait shows the men relaxing on a porch, eight 
of them topped with helmets to match Dyren-
forth's, and three visibly gripping shotgunsY 
PUBLIC RESPONSE 
The enormous public appetite for news on the 
pluviculture experiments is attested by the enthu-
siasm with which hopeful Americans from the re-
motest corners of the nation cried out for haste. 
Henry Holdes, a self-described "poor farmer" 
from the remote frontier hamlet of Yuma, Colo-
rado, wrote to Secretary Rusk, earnestly offering 
use of his land for any experiments at no charge, 
and thoughtfully including a hand-drawn map 
of his community and a table of meteorological 
observations.14 In Wichita, where the droughts of 
the late 1880s had taken a heavy toll, the Daily 
Eagle pleaded with the secretary of agriculture: 
"There could hardly be a more opportune occa-
sion for making the experiment .... Try it, Uncle 
Jerry; try it now."15 
The speed with which news from Midland 
appeared in newspapers nationwide further illus-
trates the level of national interest. On August 
10, a Monday, some twelve hours after the experi-
ment's opening salvo, rain began to fall and an 
enthusiastic party member wired Senator Farwell 
to share the good news; by Thursday, papers 
from coast to coast were ready to anoint the ex-
perimenters as the saviors of national agriculture. 
The Rocky Mountain News of Denver declared 
"They Made Rain," while the Chicago Times pro-
claimed that the visionary Farwell had "outdone 
Moses."16 As the experiments continued, the 
flood of positive press continued. The front page 
of the Washington Post announced "Bombs Cause 
Rain to FaIL"17 "Rain Made to Order" one New 
York Times front-page headline declared, inform-
ing readers that "it began to rain immediately" af-
ter Dyrenforth exploded a balloon and a healthy 
dose of dynamite. Two days later, readers learned 
that Van Horn, Texas, had experienced its heavi-
est rain in years, the cloudburst attributed to the 
party's weather meddling.1s Not mentioned was 
the fact that Van Horn is some 180 miles from 
Midland. Such was typical of the Dyrenforth-
friendly press: determined to report successful 
results, and not about to let facts stand in the way 
of a good story. Readers scarcely heard that Au-
gust generally signaled the beginning of the rainy 
season in the Texas plains, or that fewer than half 
the barrages had resulted in rain of any appre-
ciable volume {and in at least one of those cases, 
the Weather Bureau had already predicted rain 
anyway).19 
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CONCUSSIONISM AS MILITARY PROXY 
Clearly, Dyrenforth's desert venture was more 
than some parochial sideshow. On the contrary, 
it resonated with cultural attitudes about the 
environment, and gives us a window on some 
prominent modes of thinking about nature and 
settlement. In more ways than one, the din of the 
battlefield was very much in the minds of those 
who undertook, reported on, and thought about 
the experiments. Dyrenforth himself was clear 
that his driving methodology in the desert had 
always been "to imitate the effects of a great battle 
as nearly as possible."20 In describing the proceed-
ings, writers made frequent use of military imag-
ery and terminology in their descriptions of ele-
ments of the experiment as well as of the entire 
enterprise, even when the connection was not 
necessarily an obvious one. "Sounding like the 
report of a six-inch rifle on shipboard" was the 
simile offered by a New York Times reporter, de-
scribing a trial explosion of one of Dyrenforth's 
balloons in Washington, DC. 21 A concerned citi-
zen wrote the editor of the Times proposing that 
something similar to the undertaking in Texas be 
essayed in the East to relieve the ongoing drought 
there. "Let the forts on Governors Island, Fort 
Hamilton, and Staten Island, and the war vessels 
stationed at the navy yard commence a bombard-
ment, and shake the heavens until the clouds 
yield rain .... Let the Department of War issue 
an order for a general bombardment," he wrote, 
making abundantly clear his preference for heavy 
ordnance to less bellicose methods such as explo-
sive hydrogen balloons or rackarock-Iaden kites.22 
In yet another article, the writer noted that "the 
experimenters have maintained a continuous 
'skirmish' at the field of operation, while the big-
ger 'guns' in the shape of oxygen apparatus and 
hydrogen generators were being set Up."23 Even in 
the context of the experiment, the gas generators, 
which merely supplied the hydrogen and oxygen 
for the balloons, had little in common with artil-
lery pieces in either purpose or appearance. That 
the writer at any rate thought of them as guns 
illustrates the extent to which a strong undercur-
rent of military power informed understandings 
of what was taking place on the plains of Texas. 
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In addition, besides the literary allusions, there 
were more literal factors that contributed to the 
view of the experiments as a military operation. 
The U.S. Navy supplied the party with iron turn-
ings. Although the turnings were simply scrap 
metal to be used in the chemical production of 
hydrogen and oxygen, it is easy to imagine that 
someone not familiar with the term might have 
assumed that the navy was supplying Dyrenforth 
and his party with munitions. When the investi-
gators relocated from Midland to EI Paso, they 
met with the Major James Henton and Lieuten-
ant S. Allen Dyer of nearby Fort Bliss, who put 
twenty privates from the Twenty-third Infantry 
at the disposal of the experimenters, which can 
only have reinforced the public image of the en-
terprise as a military undertaking. 
If the experiments were indeed symbolic prox-
ies for real battle, who was the enemy? The Wash-
ington Post typified the answer to this question, 
characterizing the high winds that were playing 
havoc with the balloon and kite operations as 
a "powerful and relentless enemy," adding that 
Dyrenforth and company had nevertheless scored 
"a fitting victory ... in their efforts to shake wa-
ter from the burning winds."24 Other newspapers 
identified the adversary as the clouds, the sky, 
or the atmosphere, but the underlying idea was 
usually the same: that the environment, unwill-
ing to cooperate with the settlers' designs upon 
it by selfishly withholding its vital moisture, was 
the enemy.25 
"CAN WE MAKE IT RAIN!" 
Another important element that emerges in lit-
erature sympathetic to Dyrenforth's experiments 
is a characteristic prioritizing of experience over 
meteorological theory and, furthermore, a feeling 
that inflexible willpower, rather than scientific 
method, was the key to success. After all, War and 
the Weather was not much more than a compen-
dium of battle narratives appended with a dash of 
tentative meteorological theory.26 A letter to the 
New York Times considered the concussive theory 
"proven" based solely on "the testimony of many 
general officers engaged in the Mexican war and 
in the late civil war," while another concerned 
citizen opined that the results, not the mecha-
nism, should be the main object of interest, de-
claring "after the thing is done we shall all be in 
a receptive mood for the explanation of how it 
is done."27 In a letter quoted in Scientific Ameri-
can, Senator Farwell explained that his belief in 
the rainmaking power of concussion came not 
in connection with any understanding of atmo-
spheric moisture but rather from the "historical 
and undisputed" understanding that "that after 
all the great battles fought during the century, 
heavy rainfalls have occurred. "28 The New York 
Times, in explaining the influx of rain that had 
accompanied the desert trials, observed that "[tl 
he Scientific Person has not been heard from," 
but that "Gen. Dyrenforth is not a man with a 
[proof], but a man of ideas."29 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the "general" in com-
mand of the experiments was of a similar men-
tality. In October 1891, after the investigators' 
explosives had fallen silent, Dyrenforth took up 
the affirmative position in a marquee column 
for the North American Review entitled "Can We 
Make It Rain?"30 Besides the customary chronicle 
of rain-soaked battles from recent history, Dyren-
forth included a battery of testimonial letters 
from particularly esteemed Civil War veterans 
to buttress his position. Among these luminar-
ies were Joshua Chamberlain, then-governor of 
Maine who had been decorated with the Medal 
of Honor as a brevet major general in the Civil 
War; John McNulta, Illinois representative and 
Civil War general; and no less than James A. 
Garfield, former president and major general 
in the Union Army.3! And in his report to Con-
gress, Dyrenforth appended his write-up with six 
full pages of testimonials from local eyewitnesses 
who had wandered by to observe the proceed-
ings. When it came to meteorological theory, 
however, Dyrenforth had not much to say: in that 
same document, he admitted that although he 
had received a number of suggested theories as 
to the mechanism of concussive pluviculture, he 
was unable to understand many of themY But 
this was a small matter; crafting a rigorous theo-
retical basis for concussionism had always been of 
secondary importance. Rather, a social logic that 
prioritized empirical observation and bare-bones 
pragmatism informed and supported the reason-
ing of the concussionists. 
In fact, Dyrenforth-friendly literature seems to 
have been aware of the incompatibility of their 
criteria of proof-based on experience, common 
sense, and intuition-with those of the scien-
tific establishment and its functionaries, as the 
clashing paradigms engendered a simmering but 
perceptible mutual enmity. When peering across 
this gulf, pluviculture boosters painted their op-
ponents as elitist snobs and bureaucratic job-
sworths, and took a particular relish in narrating 
their failures. 33 One writer, praising Dyrenforth's 
proactive use of the congressional appropriation 
mused that the $9,000 might otherwise have 
been "squandered" had it instead been invested 
in the Weather Bureau "which, as everybody 
knows, is supplied ad nauseum with every sort 
of weather except the desired or expected sort." 
Referencing the forestry chiefs antipathy for the 
Dyrenforth expedition, the same author scoffed, 
"Mr. Fernow, we regret to say, thought that Gen. 
Dyrenforth could not make it rain, and proved 
that he could not by illustrious names which we 
will not mortify by citing here any further than 
may be necessary."H A New York Times columnist 
looked forward to the inevitable "mystification 
of the nearest local weather sharp . . . and the 
forcible overthrow of all the accumulated lore 
and stock signs of the Signal Bureau and its ob-
servers."35 The "general" himself apparently felt 
a similar disdain for bureaucratic naysayers. The 
ranch-hand cowboys, he claimed in an interview, 
were far more knowledgeable in weather matters 
than office-bound meteorologistS, whom he de-
risively called "those special advisory agents of 
Providence on weather matters. "36 
As tantalizing as the prospect of rain on de-
mand may have been (or perhaps because it 
seemed too good to be true), the concussion-
ists' doubters were many, and made their views 
known as loudly as the supporters. Forestry Divi-
sion chief Fernow, thankful to have had the ex-
periment taken off his hands, was nevertheless 
aghast at the choice of Dyrenforth as the principal 
investigator. "I strongly advise everybody to have 
his ark ready for the deluge," he quipped.37 The 
volume of reliable information trickling out of 
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Texas increased, and the mediocrity of the results 
became more apparent. Skeptical newspapers, 
which probably outnumbered the faithful from 
the end of August onward as the smoke cleared, 
characterized the experiments as "absurd, not 
to say shameless, misrepresentation," "an utter 
and ridiculous failure," and other choice phras-
es.38 The New York Times-which in August had 
published its fair share of booster columns for 
Dyrenforth and company-by November was now 
playing the experiments for laughs. As the city 
water reservoirs ran dangerously low, it mused 
that the National Guard might lend a hand by 
engaging in some artillery practice-but only as 
a "jocular suggestion."39 George Curtis, the me-
teorologist assigned to the expedition, penned a 
blistering tirade for the St. Louis Republic, calling 
the experiment a "miserable farce" and its com-
manding general "an inexcusable bungler ... his 
botchwork a burlesque on science and common 
sense."40 Not fully drained of his frustration, 
Curtis went on the attack again in the following 
year, writing that to promulgate the concussionist 
hypothesis was "to reject the light of civilization 
and to retrograde to a cruder and less rational ap-
prehension of natural phenomena."41 
Though Curtis's critiques may have been par-
ticularly searing, his sentiment was not atypical 
of his profession. Publications associated with 
related sciences such as Nature, Science, American 
Meteorological Journal, and Engineering Magazine, 
to name a few, printed essays often laced with 
scornful undertones of varying degrees of sub-
tlety, confidently asserting the impossibility of 
concussive pluviculture and tearing apart Dyren-
forth's methodology.42 The Meteorologist declared 
the theory "low and degrading. "43 Physics profes-
sor Alexander Macfarlane, who like Curtis was 
an eyewitness to the goings-on, hammered out 
a fulminating critique for the inaugural issue of 
the Transactions of the Texas Academy of Science, 
peppered with phrases and terms such as "no 
better than the medicine man of the Indians," 
"useless," "impostor," "ignorance," and "so-called 
facts and cranky arguments. "44 The acidity of the 
scientists' counterattack against the concussion-
ists underscores the epistemological and meth-
odological differences between the two groups. 
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When Curtis, Macfarlane, and others like them 
wished to rebut the concussionists, there was no 
shared foundation of knowledge on which they 
could construct the kinds of collegial arguments 
they would have made against a fellow scientist in 
the pages of Scientific American. 
DYRENFORTH'S SUCCESSORS 
Public esteem for Dyrenforth reached its zenith 
in the Texas plains in August 1891 but did not 
maintain its lofty position for long. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture declined to renew his ap-
pointment as special agent after his term expired 
the following summer. As concussionism's crit-
ics grew more numerous and vocal, the diehard 
believers, including Edward Powers, the father 
of the theory, wasted no time in making a scape-
goat of the "general," blaming the failure of the 
experiments on Dyrenforth's shoddy execution. 
The man once dubbed "General Jupiter Pluvius" 
now had a new nickname: "Dry-henceforth."45 
Yet even as the champion sank into disrepute and 
obscurity, the cause persisted, with the hallmarks 
of incorporated militarism and social logic. As 
the government tests came to an end in Texas, a 
coalition of local politicians and business leaders 
came together to pledge to carry on the experi- ' 
ments on their own funding.46 In 1894, during an 
especially dry summer, a group of Nebraska citi-
zens formed the "Rain God Association," a kind 
of rainmaking militia that raised $1,000 to give 
the concussion theory a trial of their own. The 
"Rain Gods" built a ZOO-mile line of gunpowder 
firing stations on hilltops along the forty-second 
parallel, and detonated them simultaneously, to 
no appreciable effectY In the first decade of the 
twentieth century, it was not uncommon in times 
of forest fire for locals to petition their local army 
or naval base for a barrage to try to bring some 
rain clouds.48 The most serious post-Dyrenforth 
inquiry into concussive pluviculture, however, 
came about twenty years after the "general" and 
his party had finally decamped from Texas, but it 
unfolded in the very same locale as the 1891 trials. 
In 1910, breakfast cereal king Charles w. Post's 
experimental colony at Post City, Texas, had been 
up and running for about four years.49 Located 
FIG. 2. Charles William Post. 
about one hundred miles northeast of Midland, 
Post and his colonists had thus far eked out mea-
ger harvests by experimenting with expensive 
irrigation systems, cultivating unconventional, 
drought-resistant crops, and employing dryland 
farming techniques. Post, however, saw the po-
tential for much more in the land, and after "an 
exhaustive study" of rainmaking was convinced 
that Dyrenforth had been on the right track 
all along and the concussion theory had merit. 
"General J.G. [sic) Dyrenforth, a well-knowil sci-
entist and meteorologist . .. left no doubt . . . that 
the rains were caused by the explosions," Post 
proclaimed in a special piece for Harper's Weekly. 
"[Tlhe world, generally, seems to have forgotten 
that rain could be produced artificially."50 
Between 1910 and 1912, Post conducted doz-
ens of experiments, or "battles" as he preferred 
to call them, at times also employing the terms 
"attack upon the elements" and "fight with Jupi-
ter"-and in so doing repeated all the characteris-
tic elements of the previous generation's concus-
sionists. 5l For example, in conducting his trials, 
Post directed his managers to try to emulate a 
battle, and by one account succeeded spectacu-
larly. In 1911 a reporter for the Beckham County 
Democrat happened to pass by Post City during a 
"battle" and recorded his impressions: 
[A]long the verge of cliffs we could see the 
flash, the clouds of smoke rising and with 
our ears pierced by the deafening reports we 
were with Roosevelt at San Juan Hill and 
were storming the block house .... [Als the 
increased thundering of the guns seemed 
to rend the very air over and around us, we 
thought we were with General Hooker at the 
Battle Above the Clouds.sz 
Like his pluvicultural predecessors, Post's re-
sults were at best inconsistent. From the spring 
of 1911 to the summer of 1913, he waged about 
twenty-one "battles," but only half the time did 
rain follow. Yet his patience for failure was virtu-
ally unlimited: after each unsuccessful effort, he 
would simply fine tune some variable or other 
and perhaps increase the tonnage of explosives 
(and on one occasion blame his supplier for 
faulty dynamite), as if the outcome of the experi-
ment had been a tantalizing near miss. The key to 
this conviction can be found in a letter he wrote 
to his managers, castigating them for a perceived 
lack of interest in the project: "I want extraordi-
nary attention given to this subject," he insisted, 
"for it means a very great deal to the country at 
large, and all of us are included."53 For Post, then, 
the "battles" for rain were no less than battles for 
the fate of the nation, the outcomes of which 
depended upon man's ability to master the en-
vironment. Though he was far too young to have 
fought in the Civil War, he made frequent refer-
ence to downpours that had supposedly followed 
the momentous clashes from that conflict, and 
probably imagined that just as in those battles, 
unwavering determination would be necessary 
for victory. "In these experiments we are follow-
ing a practice that absolutely and unfailingly did 
produce rain during the Civil War," he wrote, in-
voking the socially persuasive power of memory 
and experience. "Every man who was in battle 
knows that rain invariably followed the heavy 
concussions."54 Nonexperiential knowledge, by 
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contrast, was of less consequence: "I am not so 
much interested in the scientific as the practical 
side," Post wrote. "I am more engrossed in the 
results than the method."55 Indeed, Post made 
clear his distrust of certain naysaying scientists, 
declaring with certainty (as many optimistic con-
cussionists had done before him) that "the theory 
of artificial rain making is not the mere chimera 
that some scientifically inclined men would have 
us believe."56 
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN RAINMAKING 
In 1894, Mark W. Harrington, chief of the 
Weather Bureau, completed an essay for the 
Smithsonian Institution's annual report. Titled 
"Weather Making, Ancient and Modern," he 
identified three classes of weather-making ef-
forts from human history, which corresponded 
to a civilization's stage of advancement. The first 
and most primitive of these was the class of su-
perstitious efforts, which originated in formal 
or organized religious belief. Following this was 
the class of folklore remnants, which were said 
to be fragments and vestiges of the first type, yet 
maintained "a curious persistency in civilized 
countries." Finally, the class of physical meth-
ods, which Harrington proclaimed was "mainly 
American and intensely practical," appealed to 
objective physical laws rather than psychic im-
pulses as the first two did. 57 Harrington sorted 
Dyrenforth's escapade into the third category, 
but as we have seen, a great deal if not most of 
the logic behind it spawned from social expecta-
tions and beliefs. Although its adherents claimed 
scientific legitimacy, this was more a vulnerabil-
ity than a strength, as it demanded testable and 
falsifiable grounds for inquiry. Its great resiliency 
and durability-its "curious persistency," to bor-
row Harrington's term-came from the fact that 
it appealed to intuitive and obvious ideas that 
were firmly anchored in contemporary notions 
of nature and the "rightness" of the American 
conquest of North America. 
In his Harper's Weekly essay, Post perfectly 
encapsulated the spirit that had motivated both 
him and concussionists past: 
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In the spring of 1911 crops on the ranch began 
to need rain. There were no signs of nature 
that pointed to any immediate conclusion of 
the drought. There was no method by which 
I could run irrigation ditches in time to allevi-
ate conditions. It was under the stress of these 
conditions that I resolved to carry the war into 
the country of Jupiter Pluvius and bombard 
him until he surrendered enough rain to save 
the crops. 58 
CONCLUSION 
Post and the settlers had come to the West with 
the intention of conquering and reshaping what 
they found there to suit their needs. When some-
thing stood in the way of that vision, whatever it 
was, Americans relied on their will and strength 
to smash through the obstacle. 
In Post's experiments, we can discern dis-
tinct echoes of the very same driving forces that 
informed the mentality of the previous gen-
erations of concussionists. Where Dyrenforth 
sported cavalry boots and bestowed upon himself 
a lofty military rank, Post conducted "battles" 
and made sure that the Civil War was never far 
from anyone's mind in the process. Like-minded 
Americans picked up on these threads, which 
we see played out in the frequent and occasion-
ally strained allusions to weapons and battles in 
contemporary literature. From this we can under-
stand that the prevailing mentality of dominat-
ing the continent from the 1890s to the 1910s 
tended to conflate conquest of the natural world 
with military conquest.59 As well, from the publi-
cation of War and the Weather in 1870 onward, a 
powerful social logic worked behind the scenes to 
provide a convincing and durable foundation for 
the belief-a logic that drew on intuitive and ex-
periential knowledge while downplaying abstract 
and objective scientific principles. 
The persistence of concussionism in the na-
tional consciousness illuminates a mechanism 
by which nonexpert theories about the environ-
ment can ostensibly root themselves in "science" 
yet can withstand both material counterevidence 
and adamant opposition from the scientific es-
tablishment-a phenomenon with clear contem-
porary relevance. Concussionists from Powers to 
Post made gestures toward the laws of meteorol-
ogy and physics but in the main traded in social 
logic, grounding their arguments in appeals to 
subjective experience, common sense, folk knowl-
edge, intuition, and the like. 
The concussionism craze also illustrates the 
fundamental contingency of the climate change 
denial movement. About a century ago, when the 
socioeconomically Progressive ethos of continual 
growth and improvement demanded that rain 
come to arid regions of the country, settlement 
boosters assembled a quasi-scientific narrative to 
support the belief that weather was something 
that could be easily controlled and manipulated 
through artificial means. However, when the 
prospect of climate change has shifted from ad-
vantageous to potentially catastrophic, followers 
of a similar conservative doctrine now find it pru-
dent to deny the possibility that human activity 
could be the cause of climate change, or that such 
a phenomenon could even exist. The idea com-
mon to both cases is that the invisible hand of 
economic progress will reshape the environment 
for the benefit of producer and consumer. In this 
way we see that the latter-day aversion to the pos-
sibility of climate change is in no wayan essential 
facet of the American conservatism, but rather 
is contingent upon the perceived consequences 
that climate change itself is seen to engender. 
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